01What risk does this take off our hands?+
An agent with a broad credential can do anything that credential allows, for anyone, at any time. Here each tool call is checked against the person the agent acts for, the agent, the tool and the arguments, and the server's key never reaches the agent. A refund over the limit, an export nobody asked for or a tool changed on the server stops before it runs.
02Why isn't our identity provider, or the MCP server itself, enough?+
You keep your OIDC identity provider, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta or Keycloak. It says who the person is, but it does not see which tool an agent calls for that person, nor the arguments. The MCP server sees one credential and cannot tell which agent acts for whom, nor add up what agents did across calls. We check each call with the person, the agent and the earlier calls.
03What do you store about our calls, and for how long?+
For each call: the person (issuer and subject), the agent, the server, the tool, the result and, for a denial, the reason. Token exchanges and harness logins are recorded too. Arguments and tokens are left out. We keep the records for 30 days.
04How do events reach our SIEM?+
Each allowed or denied call, token exchange and harness login goes out as an OpenTelemetry log record or a signed webhook. An OpenTelemetry Collector reaches most SIEMs, such as Splunk or Datadog. Delivery retries for up to 72 hours.
05How do we learn about a risk that a rule does not block?+
In the Inbox and in Slack. A session that joins private data, outside text and an outside send raises a High signal, and an agent that drifts from its usual pattern, such as calling the export tool twenty times a minute, opens an item. A tool that changes on the MCP server stops until it is reviewed again. The messages reach the Slack channel, group or person you choose, with a link to the case in the Admin.
06Can we watch before we block?+
Yes. An agent in Report-only runs every call as usual and records what would have been denied, with the reason. When the rules are right, you switch it to Enforce; a review date reminds the team.
07In an incident, how do we cut access and investigate?+
Disable the agent, block a person or revoke one machine in the Admin; the next call is refused even with a token that has not expired. Each denial gives the agent a reference code, which opens the call in Investigate with the agent, the person, the rule that failed and the permission revision in force.
08When someone leaves the company, does access stop?+
Yes. Each of our tokens lasts 5 minutes, and a new one needs a valid token from your identity provider. Once the person is disabled there, access ends when that token expires. In a coding harness, removal from the group takes effect at the next login. A block in the Admin cuts access at once.
09How do we show what was blocked and pass an audit?+
The Overview shows allowed and refused calls and the most blocked combinations; Investigate lists each denial with its reason. Each permission change is an immutable revision with author, time and note, and each call points to the revision that applied. The same records go to your SIEM.
10Are we locked in if we want to leave?+
No. Agents sign in with the MCP authorization specification and OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693); tokens follow RFC 9396 and DPoP, events go out in OpenTelemetry and rules are written in CEL. Your identity provider does not change, and leaving means pointing the agents back to the servers.